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| North Korea's Road to Denuclearization |
| [Opinion] International community needs to heighten economic involvement after February 13 agreement |
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Jae Young Lee (ohmyjoshua) |
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Published 2007-10-31 11:18 (KST) |
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| This article was only lightly edited. <Editor's Note> |
After the long drawn-out nuclear negotiations in the Six-Party Talks, February 13 Agreement in 2007 brought them back from the brink after Washington dramatically shifted its stance on North Korea. But the outcome does not deserve much acclaim because the agreement failed to achieve actual denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.
The February 13 agreement, though fully and successfully implemented, was substantially limited because it did not affect the North’s fundamental capacity to resort to nuclear weapons. The agreement required the North to dismantle its nuclear program, i.e. production facilities for nuclear material for the use of weapons. However, most importantly, it left untouched the North’s previously produced nuclear materials and strongly alleged nuclear weapons. The agreement was dramatic, but it just confirmed the fact that no matter how far the nuclear negotiations proceeded, there must have existed an unseen wall that could not be easily penetrated.
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FROM THE SECTION |
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| The reason why this wall could not be penetrated was that if the North abandoned all of its current nuclear materials and weapons, it would have exhausted its full negotiating power and left the regime with no effective means of self-protection. This was an obvious point, but it was still extremely difficult to find a way through the wall. This was a matter of life or death for the North, and they could not give up it’s nuclear capacity as easily as other countries would have hoped.
The most foolish strategy would have been to continue taking a hard line with the North over full denuclearization. Given that this issue should be handled at the negotiating table, this hard-line attitude should be avoided at all costs because it could easily bring about the risk of a deadlock in the negotiation process. However, it really looks like there is no alternative choice in pursing denuclearization.
This may be true as long as the U.S. and other parties in the Six-Party Talks (except North Korea) insist on giving the nuclear issue the highest priority, as they have done. The complete elimination of nuclear military force from the North has emerged as the most critical security issue for the U.S. and other countries. It is also a price that the North would dearly hope not to pay to safeguard the safety of its regime; it is a clash of interests.
However, it does appear that partial denuclearization can be realized by the implementation of the February 13 Agreement without a serious clash of interests. What is needed for a full nuclear-free North Korea is for the other negotiating parties to adjust their strategy to reflect the North’s security concerns in pursuing their ultimate goal. Though this course of action may take time, it is better than risking a possible deadlock or collapse of negotiations.
One of the most appropriate ways to adjust the strategy is to enhance economic involvement in the North with the participation of more parties. But this approach has long been criticized as being a complete waste of time and money. That might have been the case in the past, but not anymore. In fact, the deeper the economic involvement, the better: it can bring about two positive effects.
Firstly, heightening the level of economic involvement to sustain North Korea’s devastating economy could make it hard for the North to withdraw its cooperation from the Six-Party Talks; especially as international pressure in support of continued denuclearization grows with the increasing economic contributions.
On the other hand, if economic aid is found wanting, it is likely to force the North to find an excuse to step back from the process and delay the negotiations whenever it feels it can easily ignore international pressure. Economic involvement is, therefore, the way to make the North remain within the Six-Party Talks.
Does international pressure matter to the North? The regime recognizes that such pressure could impose a serious threat by giving the indication that the international community could strengthen the U.S. hand and justify a military attack when the patience of the international community is completely consumed.
Secondly, Pyongyang’s fear regarding the safety of its regime, which might increase in the denuclearization process, could be tempered by increasing economic investments. More substantial economic investment could deliver a sign of good will that the United States and the other contributing countries genuinely intend to drop any plan for military attack as they invest their own efforts and money, as long as it remains a cooperative relationship. As a consequence, economic efforts could loosen the link between the North’s security concerns and its nuclear capacity. If the Pyongyang regime’s fears about its security can be diluted by economic involvement, it seems the path to full denuclearization could be paved more easily.
Since the February 13 agreement, hopes for peace on the Korean Peninsula have steadily been rising. However, the reality is still far behind. Now, more than any other time, contributing nations require a wise and moderate approach rather than rushing to achieve denuclearization; they need to enhance economic involvement in North Korea with the participation of more countries. The U.S. and other countries are particularly unlikely to grant the military junta any safety guarantees anytime soon until the regime completely dismantles its entire nuclear capacity, which is even more unlikely at this moment. An enhanced level of economic contribution, though not equivalent to such a guarantee, could function as a substitute to induce the North to carry out full denuclearization.
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©2007 OhmyNews
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